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1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE

that it does lead us tov:ard a brighter
and more peaceful world .
After the co !deration of all this testimony-as w stated originally in the
report of the cparedness Investigatmg
CommHtee, wl reference to this phase
of our hearln s-we concluded solidly
that this treat would deny us the necessary opport lUes to test fully and
and fully meet r military reqmrements,
and that any
the prospective positive
and constmct ·e gains resulting from
the treaty did ot overcome those losses
or dLSadvanla• s and d1d not justify our
giving up wh
we are having to surr ender and wh we w1ll surrender under
the terms o! t
treaty.
Therefore,
. President, I remain of
the opinion an the final conclusion that
the treaty do jeopardlze our security
and should no at. this t1me be approved
and ratified.
I WlSh espec lly to commend the distinguished m
nty leader [Mr. MANsFIELD] althou
others deserve comm endation,
tor the very fine way in
which he has
dled this extensive and
very import
debate preceding what
p erhaps will b the most important vote
in the Senate
many years . So I comm end him ve highly for the very fine
way in which e has performed his duties and carrie out ·s obligations. Cert ainly he
u
have the greatest
confidence
spect o! the Senator
f rom Miss1ssl 1 and of all the other
Mem bers of this body. I thank him tor
yleldlng this time to me.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
yield myself 20 minutes.
The PRESIDlNG OFFICER. The
Senator from Montana is recognized for
20 mtnutes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. First, Mr. President, I wish to thank the Senator from
Mississippi for his kind word and for his
unfailing courtesty, consideration, and
gr aciousness during the many ditncult
days we have had while the Senate has
been considering the treaty. It is true
t hat this has not been one of the great
debates of the century; but I believe that
in m any respects it has been of more
fundamental slgni.flcance and of greater
importance, because in my opinion no
other treaty in which this country has
been invohed has been gone into so
deeply and so thoroughly and by so many
Senators, as is evident from the fact that
t hree Senate committees held hearings
on the treaty for several weeks, and from
t he further !act that the Senate Prep ar edness Investigating SubcommitLee,
under the chairmaruhip of the able and
distinguish ed Senator from Mississippi,
held hearings for an e\·en longer period
of time on the m1ht ary a<pects of this
p rogram.
No'.V we ha\'!~ bc!'n told, if we can belie\'C the news lickcrs-:md I believe the
statement is true-that, as of now, approximat ely 100 nations have formally
rati.fled or signed the test ban treaty. W e
know that six nations-France, Communist China, Albania, North Vietnam,
North Korea, and Cuba-have given no
indication that they will sign the treaty.
I n fact, I believe exactly the oppos1te
w ill be the case-that they will not slgn
the treaty.

Now the hour of decision is at hand.
Tomorrow, at 10 : 30 a .m ., the Senate will
vote on this m ost momentous treaty,
which will m ean so much tn the lives of
the people of this Nation and tn the lives
of the peoples of the world.
Mr. Presiden t, tha t the r ecord may be
straigh t, let m e say that it should show
that this treat y reflects the j udgment not
only of this Democratic administration
b ut of lts p redecessor R epublican ad nunistra tion. It is a tr ibute to the persisten ce for peace on the part of Mr.
Eisenhov.er no less than Mr. Ketmedy.
The record sh ould show. too, that
Members of U1is body have played an lmm erue role in the conception of this
treaty, a.nd in sh aping it and in bring'in g
it to this m om en t of ultima te decision.
In this connection, I think of th e work of
the Senator from Minnesota [Mr.
H UMPHREY], the distinguished Whip and
chairman of the Senate S ubcommittee
on Disarmament, of the wor k of the Sen ator from Tennessee [ Mr. GoREJ, the
Senator from Alabama [Mr SPARKMAN],
the ranking Republican m ember of the
Foreir-n Relatioru Committee. the Senator f rom Iowa [Mr. HtCKENLOOPERJ, t he
senior Senator from Vermont [Mr.
AIKEN], and oth ers wh o have observed
the actual p rocess of negotiation over the
years, on behalf of the Senate and made
sign ificant contributions. I think of the
work o! the Senator from Idaho [Mr.
CHURCH l, and the Senator !rom Connecticutt [Mr. DoDD], whose creative
conceptions were in accord wit h the modifications which u ltima tely produced
agreem ent.
I think of th e bipa rtisan contribution
of t he Senators who journeyed to Moscow
t o witness the signing of the treaty-Mr.
AIKEN, Mr. SALTONSTALL, Mr. PASTORE,
M r . SPARKMAN, Mr. FULBRIC:HT, a n d Mr.
H UMPHREY.
I think of t he Senator f rom Geor gia
[ M r. RuSSELL]. the Senator from Arizona fMr. GOLDWATER], t he Senator from
Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS]. t he Senator
from South Ca r olina [Mr. THURMOND] ,
and the Sena tor from Maine l Mrs.
SMITH], all distinguished exp erts in military matters, whose penet rating questioru have compPI!ed all of us to shar pen
our understanding of this step. The
RECORD should r efl ect their cont ributioru.
And it should refl ect, too. Mr. President, the wor k of t h e great ch airm an of
the Committee on Foreign R elatlol'IS
[Mr. Fm.BRIGHTl. In considering t his
treaty, he guided not only th e m ember s
of that commit tee but th e Sen a tors of the
Armed Services Com mittee and the J oint
Committee on Atomic Energy in one of
the most profound, impartial, and thor ough studies ever conducted by an a gency
of the Senate. I can recall of n o other
occasion in which the Senate was better
equipped by the work of its committee
to proceed, fully inform ed and with due
deliberatiOn to decision.
Finally, Mr P resident, I wish to all ud e
to the contribution of th e great American who sits acr oss the aisle, to t h e Senator from lllinois, the dlsti.ngu.ished minority leader [Mr. DIRKSENl. He withheld his j ud.gment until h e had fully informed hinlSelf on thls treaty, until he
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had pondered its implications, not to his
party, not to himself but to the Nation
and to the living generat!oru and those
yet to come. When he knew in his mind
and in his heart that it was right, then
and only then, dld he decide. And once
having <lecided, he was as a rock of granite, impervious to the storms of criticism
wh ich beat about him.
The Senator from Tilinois is a great
Am erican. And, Mr. President, he could
n ot be a great American unless he were
also an understanding and compassionate human b eing. His guidance. his reassur ance, his wisdom, In this instance.
increases the debt which the leadership
owes to him, and which the Senate and
t h e Nation as a whole owe the Senator
from Illinois for his high patriotic public
service.
Mr. President, shortly we will vote on
the question of advice and consent to the
rat ification of the nuclear test ban
treaty. What needed saying on this
treaty has been said again and again in
comlll.ittee and on the floor. It ought to
be clear by this time that not a single
Senate proponent favors the treaty, because he believes that the Russians have
signed it out of love lor the United
States. There are no dupes in the Senate
on that score. The Russians have their
own reasoru for signing this treaty.
They are not necessarilY reasons o! m111tary advantage at all although that possibility has been discussed thoroughly.
Indeed, one does not have to search far
tor plausible reasons for the Russian
signature.
Mr. Khrushchev has his share of int ernal difficulties. The Soviet-Canadian
wheat deal of Cana dian wheat for $500
million is one example. The Russian
people are consumers, too, and nucleonics is not yet a substitute for n].ltrition.
The race to the moon is not yet producing edible green cheese. Missiles are not
yet delivering milk. Nuclear fallout does
not drop as the gentle rain on parched
a gricultural lands.
And if internal difficulties are insufficient to explain the Russian acceptance
of t h ls treaty, we may find other reasons
in Mr. Khrushchev's external difficulties
and, particularlY. in the Soviet relationship with China. The Soviet Unlon is
confronted with a mllitant and hostile
ideological challenge from the Chinese.
I t Is confronted with a China which lays
grea t stress on its racial affinjty with all
Asians as against European Russia. It
is confronted with growing Chinese territor ial pressures in Central Asia. In this
connection it should be noted that the
Sunday pa pers cany the reports from
Moscow tha t Russia charges that its
frontier was violated by China 5,000
times in 1962. And also in this connection I ask un animous coruent that there
be printed at the end of my remarks an
editorial appearing in the New York Herald Tribune dated September 23 and a
statement wh ich I made on September 6
referring to t h e Sino-Soviet border issue
as, possibly, a major motivation in the
Russian interest In the nuclear test ban
t reaty.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, It Is so ordered.
(See exhibits 1 and 2.>
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r.Ir MANSFIELD. In short, Mr. Pr<'sld nt quite apart. from military matters,
th rl.' are any number of plausible reasons
ror the soviet Union to want this treaty
v. lth the United Stnt<'s. But that Is the
b 1 !ness of the Russians. It is not ours
F1 om our point of \;ew, there arc similar valid 1easons for seeking this trea~y.
w~ do liOt haYC to love the Russians to
see the ad\antages of this treaty. We
lla \ r only to recognize what unrestricted
t<'stin" of nuclear weapons. Jet alone nuciNir warfare itself. may do to the civllizatiOn v.e know and to the health of the
people of the United States, particularly
to youn<>er generations here and on the
way Is that m Itself not sufficient 1eason for seeking this treaty?
Let no Member forget that this treaty
was proposed and pursued, not by Mr.
Khrushchev, but by President Eisenhower and by President Kennedy In succession. And let no Member suggest that
they pursued It-and none has-becau~e
they are fools or careless or not as wise
or as well informed as Senators in these
matters. And let no Member suggestand none has-that these Presidents pursued t.he treaty for any reason ot.her than
that they were convinced that, on balance, 1t is In the interests of the United
State:<, first and foremost.
Now it is possible to disagree with the
judgment o! two Presidents in succession.
That is what the constitutional practice
of ratification Is designed to permit, and
I question no Senator's motives 1!, In his
judgment, he votes in the end for the reJection of this treaty.
But I would plead with those who are
so inclined to consider one last time what
the failure to ratify this treaty would
mean.
It would mean the resumption of tests
in the atmosphere and on the sea, not
only by the United States but by the Soviet Union as well, with consequent rise
in the exposure to radlation-lnduced
sicknesses of our people as well as others.
It would Insure a marked Increase In
defense expendltures and, hence. in the
already heaVY burdens of the U.S. taxpayer. For, if we cannot ta.ke this step
toward security by an instrument of
peace, then It follows that we had better
put more of our resources Into the Instruments of war. For that is precisely
what others will also be doing, as the
fears and antagonisms multiply In the
fertile soil of a sanctioned International
nuclear anarchy.
To reject this treaty would be to precipitate a worldwide revUlsion among the
dozens of nations who have followed the
leadership of this Nation for many years
and who have already signed this treaty
in good faith.
To reject this treaty, Mr. President.
will be to snuff out that fiicker of light
which for a brief moment lit the rational
and reasonable hopes of the Nation and
thew rid.
It will. in short. bring an end to the
hope for a more reliable peace through
negotiations. and properly so. For it
will make clear that jiYhile th~ President
does not fear to negotiate, lhe Senate
fears the consequences of negotiations
which are finally successful. It will
make clear that we reject these consequences even when they are most cir-
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ct:mscrlbed. even when we have taken
all poss1ble steps to guard a alnst he
risks.
These are some of the considerations
which I would hope the Senate vall bear
in mind as we procN•d t.o the final vo~
on tomolTow mormng. And may I say,
Mr. Presiden . that the responsibility for
th1s decision is not BS$Jgnable to any scienlist or milltary or CIVIlian official of
the Go\·ernment. This moment Is for
elected Senators alone. It is, for us to
dec1de to join with or lo rrfuse to join
\\ 1th an elected President to safeguard
throu~h the treaty the mt<'rests of the
people and the States which we repreSPnt.

W11I we consent to put this very lunit<'d but firm brake upon the headlong
race toward the nuclear inferno? Can
we afford to take this chance? Indeed.
Mr Pres1dent, can we alford not to take
It?
Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of the time.
EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Herald Tnbune, Sept.
23, 1963]
SPARKS ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER

Of r•ll the former imperallst powers which
had helped themselves to slices of Chinese
territory during the open door free-for-all
period, only one remains with extensive holdIngs on the Asian mainland. It Is Russia.
Ideological debates are one thing. but they
are largely verbal and Intellectual. Real estate 1s quite another. It is something to
which all good Communists, llke the capital·
lsts they denounce, attaCh great value.
Pelptng may or may not be sincere In its
Ideological debate with Moscow. But there is
now little doubt tb&t 1t Is deadly serious
about Its cla.lms to Chinese territory which
the czars had conquered and which the present Communist rulers of Russia had
Inherited.
The Chinese have embarked on a course
which, if continued. could lead to a denunciation of the Peiplng treaty of 1860, extracted from the Manchu emperor by a wily
Russian envoy of the czar. The treaty fixed
the present Sino-Soviet frontier-a frontier
which the Chinese refuse to honor.
This Is proved by the disclosure, In an omcia! Soviet Government statement, tb&t the
Mao Tse-tung regime has attempted "to appropriate individual sections of Soviet territory" and bact violated the border 5,000
times during 1962 alone.
There have been border clashes between
Russians and Chinese throughout their history. It Is not unlikely, in the light of the
extraordinary Soviet disclosure, that these
clashes have been resumed and have grown
to serious proportions during 1962 and 1963.
The renewal of physical conflict (as distinct from ideological conflict) goes a long
way toward explaining the sudden Soviet interest In coming to an understanding with
the Western Powers. We may now have an
opportunity to extract concessions which previously were beyond our reach. Let's hope
President Kennedy and his Secretary of State
mnke good use of it
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